Just 6 months ago, nobody knew what ISIS or IS is all about, let alone foresaw the danger it represented to the stability of the whole Middle East. The US and its allies in the region were visibly taken aback by the growing menace of that faceless group. The question then is, exactly when the US administration came about to take this terrorist organization seriously. Otherwise some reassessment is in order in the light of its inability to predict the ISIS phenomenon. And many more civilians in Iraq and Syria are paying with their own innocent blood as a consequence of this intelligence mess.
CNN polls just before the midterm elections did measure the American public mood as 'angry', but hardly an indication of what's fundamentally wrong with the Obama policies in the last 6 years. Of course the US political climate remained confusing and the Administration still was reeling after its shutdown while the gridlock was lingering on. But the economy is on the right track, performing pretty well if one relies on job numbers and the stock market is at record high and climbing. On the other hand, not surprisingly the GOP is not by any means the darling of the American electorate to say the least.
So what has happened to the American voters? The answer lies in the perception that this president and his foreign policy is a failure, one of the few times that international events made a difference. From Vladimir Putin coup de force in Crimea to the impasse on the Palestinian issue, the muddle nuclear dispute with Iran, and lately the worsening situation in Iraq, these crisis have taken their toll with the American public. American unsettling withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 and the emergence of ISIS have, among other things, hurt the US credibility and curtailed its influence around the world.
It's not a mere coincidence that we have seen dissenting voices within the Obama administration led by Defense officials like Robert Gates and Leon Panetta. Through their memoirs, they expressed doubts about their own commander in chief on many foreign policy decisions, mainly the US strategy in Iraq and in Afghanistan. And adding insult to injury, the well publicized defense cuts through sequester announced by Sec. Chuck Hagel was an unfortunate ill timed event. On the next day, Putin decided to invade the Ukrainian Crimea, right under the nose of all the Western powers. Hats off Czarivitch Vladimir! We haven't heard about the proposed Pentagon cutbacks since, nor will we hear anything again from Chuck Hagel.
The Marketing of ISIS
Had it not been for the macabre news of this group brutal attacks in the last few months, ISIS ( for Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) would be a cute and attractive name brand any company would love to adopt. And effectively some firms that used the ISIS name had to forfeit it for fear of customers backlash from now on. By the way the US refuses to call them ISIS for the reason I just mentioned. As you may know, it's the name of the principal Egyptian goddess which means the ''mother support of the throne''. By choosing the ISIS acronym, or ISIL (for Islamic State for Iraq and the Levant, the area of Syria according to ancient calling) and now the shorter and simpler IS (for Islamic State), one has to concede to this terrorist organization an obvious flair, and an underlying skill for vocabulary. And it makes its selling much easier.
During the Indochina War, the French called Ho Chi Minh troops as Viet Minh (for Việt Nam Đồng Minh Hội, an alliance of political parties against colonial France) or les Viets, the kind of diminutive word for an enemy to be dismissed. The reality of battle would haunt the French soldiers as they fought against a fierce adversary that evoked dread and fear. France is still feeling discomfort recalling its defeat in the hands of an enemy its troops had sorely underestimated. During WW2 with their knack for vocabulary they called the Germans as Boches a derogatory word used since 1860 ('boules en bois' meaning hard heads). As an anecdote, the German kitchenware BOSCH capitalized on it with a successful ads campaign in France as: 'c'est bien, c'est beau, c'est BOSCH'.
The Americans also had a similar attitude towards the Japanese, calling them Japs, or Japes a not so subtle label with racist connotation, which had its origin in 1880 in London from the slogan 'Rap the Jap'. Fortunately, unlike the French, they ended up on top of their enemy. During the war in Vietnam, the US servicemen called their opponents as VC (Viet Cong) and then used the friendly word Charlie as a code name. It derived from the NATO phonetic alphabet 'Victor-Charlie' further shortened. I thought that this practice, condoned by the US authorities was a mistake, by again taking the other side not too seriously. Also naming your sworn enemy Victor Charlie didn't bode well for the outcome of the war.
By shortening its brand name to IS, the ISIS group surreptitiously is claiming more countries could become part of the caliphate... Cities in Libya and in Egypt Sinai are joining the rank and the movement is spreading despite US heavy bombings. Like toxic mushrooms, the more we destroy them, the farther they spread making it very hard to sustain an intensive air campaign and dissuading any attempt for ground troops. Boko Haram in Nigeria, al Qaeda in Mali (AQIM), al Shabab in Somalia and Kenya, GIA in Algeria, the radicalized Muslim Brotherhood and jihadist cells in Egypt, the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan... These groups have a common thrust at destabilizing their part of the world. The strategic alliance will enable their synchronized terrorist activities and sharing their resources to effectively speed up the movement.
The psychological battle has also been heating up and IS so far has a clear edge by winning the first round. We don't know much about the leadership and the brains who devise their strategic planning but experts have given them high mark for their actions, particularly on the field of hearts and minds. Whoever lead this organization have a subtle grasp of western techniques and cultural habits by using short (mono)syllabic codewords handy for slogans. Combined with the limitless potential of IT and social media to promote their cause and strengthening their influence, this group is a real threat to be reckoned with. We should expect more stunts: after a newly minted currency, IS will undoubtedly offer plenty for its followers like a national anthem, a few self serving documentaries and books for the world to know.
The birth of ISIS
With the downfall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq was festering with jihadist groups from the Sunni community battling against the new power in Baghdad. By invading Iraq with the pretense to uproot the presence of Al Qaeda, the US was facing the opposite: a growing presence of that group and its affiliates. With the death of Zarquawi the Al Qaeda Iraq (AQI) commander in June 2006, ISIS came gradually to prominence as an offshoot of that entity, under the helm of Abu Nakr al-Baghdadi its spiritual leader (who replaced another Baghdadi killed in 2010) and now the caliphate of ISIS.
Deeply involved in suicidal attacks and creating havoc against the Shi'ite ranks during the US invasion, his profile didn't attract attention until 2011 when the US completed its withdrawal from Iraqi territory. ISI (prior to the Syrian war) was decimated and on the verge of extinction during the tribal upsurge financed by the CIA in 2007. It has a new lease on life thanks to Malaki disastrous handling that exacerbated the Sunni minority unto further armed rebellion. With the death of bin Laden in 2011, Baghdadi vowed retaliation on behalf of all jihadists in Iraq and promoted himself as the de facto heir of the rebellion against the US and the Baghdad Shi'ite.
In October 2011, the State Department put a 10 million $ reward on his head, sensing his growing threat to the ensuing power struggle for the control of Iraq, post-US presence. Baghdadi emergence during that key period demonstrates his sharp political acumen to fulfill his ambition as the leader and unifier of all resistance groups against the US invader. He was keenly aware of the worsening position of PM Malaki and his coalition. The Baghdad government, belittled by infighting and corruption at all levels was also undermined by the mounting presence of rival Shi'ite militia groups. With the Americans on the way out, the time has come for some bold and bloody attacks like in Hilla (May 2011), in Mosul (August) and around Baghdad days after the complete withdrawal of US troops (December).
That period of Iraq sectarian war has to be highlighted to underline the complete failure of the US intervention since 2003. Despite the trillion dollar spent on intervening, propping up a civilian regime of M. Malaki and his clique, and with its massive military presence, the US had no leverage whatsoever on the course of events in Iraq. It was a disaster on every aspect. After more than ten years of equipping, training and rebuilding the military apparatus in Iraq, the situation is even worse with the Iraqi army disintegrating under the IS offensive in Mosul and Anbar province. Once again the strategy for shifting the burden of the mission on the ground to the host nation didn't work. The question is whether the Iraqis need to be retrained, re-equipped and for what result? There's no going back and spend another trillion in Iraq, under any circumstance. IS knows that.
US intervention in Iraq revisited
We are facing against an enemy who has firm territorial claims, guided by an ideology based on raw brutality and violence and who publicized message successfully reached the tender ears of many disenfranchised young people in the West. By allowing the Shi'ite majority to wreak vengeance on the Sunnis after the fall of Saddam, the US is now paying the price for renewed sectarian conflict that risks to continue for decades. What did Iraqis gain from the fall of Saddam Hussein? Other than the disappearance of the dictator and his cohorts, the result turned out to be calamitous.
To put it in a more challenging way: if the US had to choose between a maligned and obnoxious Saddam or an Iraq under the ISIS potentate, which situation is more acceptable? Mr Putin's view of the US invasion of Iraq as an ''historical mistake with the gravest consequences for years to come", was in retrospect a prophetic statement indeed. Despite in depth reports and soul searching studies during the aftermath of Vietnam, the US administration again didn't learn the lessons of history. What had the failure in Vietnam taught us, that makes it so hard to remember?
Conclusions
1. US military intervention by supporting one (losing) side of the conflict to solve a sectarian or religious fight is self defeating. It will create more violence and resentment from the other parties of the conflict thus prolonging the suffering of the people. And they tended to be very drawn out wars. And it's time to ask the question: how come fighters of the opposite side always prevailed? They weren't better trained or equipped, with no air support and no high tech resources. In fact the odds were all against them. The only explanation is morale, and for that, material resources won't help. Like drugs, money as a mean of rewarding allegiance or trust from greedy partners in war will be counterproductive.
2. The US did make contingency planning about 'nation building' for the post Saddam Iraq, as it did for South Vietnam. Condolezza Rice at the NSC sent it to the State Department for discussion and review. It was a waste of time and effort and the result in Iraq was never to be seen. The reason is quite simple: the US won't succeed in other countries with an idea it doesn't want to apply on its own people. How the US government could impress upon a host nation the very project of a strong central government when it lectures and promotes the exact opposite at home? You tell me.
3. Moderate political forces never existed in failed states where the US had tried to intervene militarily. The so called peaceful 'third force' sandwiched between 2 warring factions is rarely capable of galvanizing any significant base in a police state. No 'moderate' opposition alternative in that context ever existed long enough to build a critical mass and a rallying point for the voiceless majority. In a merciless world of tribal societies, the rule of survival by the fittest is tantamount. To artificially create and support moderate factions in countries like Syria, Iraq or Libya is a waste of time. Although the Syrian situation is a challenging case and a test for the US resolve. Unfortunately, there will be a price to pay either way.
4. IS is not aiming to threaten the US on its home soil but merely to isolate the US by dismembering its Middle East and African friends from within. Unlike Al Qaeda which relied on spectacular bombing attacks on Western soil, IS prefers homegrown territorial control in nations too decomposed for any possible remedy. It also aims for oil rich nations like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to be prime targets, where any regime collapse would severely damage the US footprint in the world, not to mention the disastrous fallout of any oil shortage.
5.Nations evolve through different periods of stability and turmoil. Any attempt to speed up and shortcut this normal evolution will have a disastrous impact. We cannot expect nations, burdened by their checkered history and relegated centuries behind to attain our model of social transformation in a matter of years. 'Nation building' as discussed earlier is an euphemism and a pretext for imposing that type of dash into the future. As a solution, it may be worse than the problem. And to put it bluntly, democracy and free society are not exportable for they are neither required nor attainable by all existing nations.
